Prenatal Injuries and the Nonviable Infant by DePaul College of Law,
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 2 Spring-Summer 1954 Article 9 
Prenatal Injuries and the Nonviable Infant 
DePaul College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
DePaul College of Law, Prenatal Injuries and the Nonviable Infant, 3 DePaul L. Rev. 257 (1954) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol3/iss2/9 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
COMMENTS
new case presents a problem which must be decided on its own merits
and equities.
Exhumation is an area in which deep human emotions are involved.
Thus, there would be much difficulty and hardship if the court were to
apply strictly objective standards in reaching its decisions.
Because of the nature of disinterment, there has not been a great deal of
litigation in this field. It is probable, however, that the litigation will in-
crease greatly in the future. Cemeteries are growing older and some are
commensurately more decrepit. In all likelihood many people will ulti-
mately desire to remove their loved ones from their present places of
repose.
If the courts could decide on a set of more objective standards for
universal use in determining disinterment cases, much confusion, uncer-
tainty, and litigation would be eliminated in this particular phase of the
law. At this writing, however, the probability seems to be that the status
of the law as to disintemment will unfortunately remain unchanged until
farsighted administrators, legislators, and attorneys take positive steps for-
ward, even as they have done in other phases of the law.
PRENATAL INJURIES AND THE NONVIABLE INFANT
In recent years, American courts have been repudiating a long en-
trenched doctrine whereby infants en ventre sa mere,' both viable and
nonviable,2 are denied a cause of action and right of recovery against
those who wrongfully inflict prenatal injuries." The modern trend has
1 "A child is said to be en ventre sa mere before it is born; while it is a foetus."
Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1951).
2 "Viability-Livable, having the appearance of being able to live . . . capable of
life. This term is applied to a newly-born infant, and especially to one prematurely
born, which is not only born alive, but in such a state of organic development as to
make possible the continuance of its life." Black's Law Dictionary, (4th ed., 1951);
"Viable-Capable of living; born alive and with such form and development of
organs as to be normally capable of living. . . ." Webster's New International Diction-
ary (2d ed., unabridged, 1951); "It is to be noted that there is a medical distinction
between the term 'embryo' and a 'viable foetus.' The embryo is the foetus in its
earliest stages of development, especially before the end of the third month, but the
term 'viable' means that the foetus has reached such a stage of development that it
can live outside the uterus. American Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 19 Ed. Dorland,
pp. 483, 1605." Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 n. 8 (D.C. D.C., 1946); "A viable
foetus has been defined as one sufficiently developed for extra-uterine survival, nor-
mally a foetus of seven months or older. (Stedman, Medical Dictionary, 1234 (16th
Ed. Taylor, 1946).) 'All authorities agree that at some time during the period of
gestation, the infant, yet unborn, reaches a stage of development where it can live
outside of the mother.' Taylor, Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 34
(10th Ed.). See: Dorland, The American Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 1625 (20th
Ed. 1945)." Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 427, 114 N.E. 2d 412, 417 (1953).
8 ".. . that in the absence of a statutory provision requiring a different result, a
pre-natal injury affords no basis for an action in damages in favor of the child. The
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been to accept the arguments of the early dissenters to the doctrine, and
allow the viable foetus a cause of action. Illinois has just recently joined
this trend.4 Emphasis in both the old and the modern cases has been on the
viable foetus, with little or nothing being said concerning the rights of
the nonviable foetus. Whether the day is not far off when a nonviable
foetus can maintain a tort action and recover for prenatal injuries, is best
determined by close examination of the reasoning and arguments of cases
dealing with the problem.
BIRTH OF A DOCTRINE: THREE FOUNDATION CASES
For many years, courts and legal writers have reiterated that the deci-
sion in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton," was the foundation for
the doctrine that a viable infant en ventre sa mere could not recover for
wrongfully inflicted prenatal injury. Actually, this case was only one of
three cases wherein the doctrine was born." Each of the members of this
triumvirate contributed an essential ingredient to the doctrine, either
through decision, dicta or application of the preceding case. In order to
realize how this occurred, it is necessary to make a careful analysis of
each cise.
In the Dietrich case, suit was brought by an administrator under the
Massachusetts Wrongful Death Statute, on behalf of a deceased infant.
The mother of the deceased slipped and fell upon a defect in the highway
of the defendant town. As stated by the court:
At the time, she was between four and five months advanced in pregnancy, the
fall brought on a miscarriage, and the child, although not directly injured, un-
less by a communication of the shock to the mother, was too little advanced in
foetal life to survive its premature birth.7
There was some "testimony" that the child moved its limbs 5 or 10 min-
utes after birth. The lower court ruled that the action could not be main-
tained. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed this decision in an
opinion delivered by Justice Holmes. He first rejected analogies between
doctrine of the civil law and the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts that an unborn
child may be considered as in esse for some purposes, when for its benefit, has been
characterized as a legal fiction not indulged in the courts to the extent of allowing an
action for injuries occasioned before its birth." 52 Am. Jur., Unborn Children § 98
(1944); "A person who negligently causes harm to an unborn child is not liable to
such child for the harm." Rest., Torts S 869 (1939).
4 Amann v. Faidy, 415 I11. 422, 114 N.E. 2d 412 (1953) expressly overrules Allaire
v. St. Lukes Hospital, 184 1. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
5 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
6 The other two cases are Walker v. Great Northern Railway Co., 28 L.R. (Ire.)
69 (1891) and Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital, 184 I1l. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
7 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15 (1884).
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the case in issue and those wherein an unborn infant was recognized at
common law as an existing person, for the purposes of the criminal law,
and as a person with legally enforceable rights to real and personal prop-
erty on the civil side. He also noted the lack of precedent for the action:
•.. no case, so far as we know, has ever decided that, if the infant survived, it
could maintain an action for injuries received by it while in its mother's womb.8
Holmes then made a statement that has been repeated in almost every
subsequent case on prenatal injuries:
. . . that, as the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury,
any damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was re-
coverable by her.9
The facts of the Dietrich case make it evident that the deceased infant was
nonviable when the injury occurred. 10 Thus, Holmes was referring to a
nonviable foetus when he said the unborn child was a part of the mother.
Nowhere in the opinion does he expressly state that this thinking should
be applicable to viable infants." However, the language used by Holmes
is very broad and subject to the interpretation that it is applicable to all
unborn infants. Many subsequent cases have noted that the infant in the
Dietrich case was nonviable.12 It has been said that the Dietrich case was
a misapplication of the doctrine of stare decisis, and that "Much of the
opinion in that case is sheer dicta. '""1
The second of the foundation cases was Walker v. Great Northern
Railway Co.14 The action was brought by an infant plaintiff for prenatal
injuries sustained when her mother, a passenger on a train, was injured
through the alleged negligence of the defendant carrier. The child was
viable when the injury occurred, and was born, crippled and deformed,
after a normal period of gestation. The lower court sustained defendant's
8 Ibid., at 15.
9 Ibid., at 17.
10 It does not appear conclusively from the facts stated that the child actually sur-
vived its birth. We are only told that there was some testimony that the child moved
its limbs 5 or 10 minutes after birth. There is no stated evidence that the child's respi-
ratory system ever functioned.
11 It must be noted that Holmes did not point out any differences between the viable
and nonviable foetus, nor did he make any other distinctions between them.
12 Justice Boggs' dissent in Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital, 184 I11. 359, 56 N.E. 638
(1900); Chief Justice Brogan's dissent in Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d
489 (S. Ct., 1942), at 459 and 685; Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio
St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 334 (1949); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. D.C., 1946);
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951); Amann v. Faidy, 415 111.
422, 114 N.E. 2d 412 (1953).
Is Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (S. Ct., 1942), dissent at 459, 469,
and 685, 687.
1428 L.R. (Ire.) 69 (1891).
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demurrer to the complaint and the plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff's appellate
brief cited Blackstone:
Life [is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individ-
ual; and it] begins in contemplation of Law, as soon as the infant is able to stir
in its mother's womb.15
The plaintiff also argued that an unborn infant had legal rights in the
criminal and civil law; that it was immaterial that there was no contract of
carriage between defendant and the child, since the defendant had con-
sented to the infant's presence. The defendant's brief argued that the
infant-plaintiff was, in "rerum naturae," not a person at the time of the acci-
dent and therefore could not sustain the action; that the defendant had
contracted only to carry the child's mother; that there was no precedent
for this action. Neither brief cited the Dietrich case. The upper court
affirmed the defendant's demurrer.
Each of the four judges wrote a separate opinion. Chief Justice O'Brien
discussed at great length the rights of unborn infants in other branches of
the law. He refused to decide if the child had a right to recover for pre-
natal injury and concluded:
I decide the present case upon a single ground, namely, that there are no facts
set out in the statement of claim which fix the defendants with liability for
breach of duty as carriers of passengers. 16
Justice Harrison also based his decision solely on the fact that the de-
fendant had not contracted to carry the child as a passenger and hence
owed it no duty. The third judge, Justice O'Brien, 17 seemed struck with
the novelty of the action and the fact that there was no precedent. He ex-
pressly stated that he favored a cause of action for the child, "in the ab-
stract," but that impossibility of proof barred the action.'8 Many later
decisions have quoted verbatim his argument that the legislature, not the
courts, should resolve the issue:
The law is in some respects a stream that gathers accretions with time from
new relations and conditions. But it is also a landmark that forbids advance on
15 Ibid., at 71. The bracketed portion of this quotation has been inserted to make the
material conform to the verbatim quotation from 1 BI. Comm. 116.
16 Ibid., at 78.
17 The opinion shows there were two Justices named O'Brien. The first opinion was
written by the Chief Justice.
18 "But there are instances in the law where rules of right are founded upon the in-
herent and inevitable difficulty or impossibility of proof. And it is easy to see on what
a boundless sea of speculation in evidence this new idea would launch us. What a field
would be opened to extravagance of testimony, already great enough-if Science could
carry her lamp, not over certain in its light where people have their eyes, into the
unseen laboratory of nature-could profess to reveal the causes and things that are
hidden there-...." Walker v. Great Northern Railway Co., 28 L.R. (Ire.) 69, 81
(1891).
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defined rights and engagements: and if these are to be altered,-if new rights
and engagements are to be created,-that is the province of legislation, and not
of decision.19
Justice Johnson also gave voice to arguments many courts were later to
repeat. He first noted that there was no contractual liability between the
infant and defendant. He then said:
If it [liability] did not spring out of the contract it must, I apprehend, have
arisen (if at all) from the relative situation and circumstances of the defendants
and plaintiff at the time of the occurrence of the act of negligence. But at that
time the plaintiff had no actual existence; was not a human being; and was not
a passenger-in fact, as Lord Coke says, the plaintiff was then pars viscerum
matris, and we have not been referred to any authority or principle to show
that a legal duty has ever been held to arise toward that which is not in esse in
fact and has only a ficticious existence in law, so as to render a negligent act a
breach of that duty.20
The third foundation case was Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital.21 The ac-
tion was commenced in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, and
was brought by the next friend of a living infant who was born with a
shrunken and shriveled left side, foot and hand. The defendant was a hos-
pital to which the infant's mother had been admitted about ten days
before the expected birth of the child. The mother was injured by a fall
in an elevator of the hospital, and the deformed infant was born four days
later. The Superior Court sustained defendant's demurrer to the com-
plaint; the plaintiff appealed and the case was taken to the Illinois Appel-
late Court.22 The plaintiffs in their appellate brief advanced the same argu-
ments as the plaintiffs in the Walker case. The defendant's brief cited the
Dietrich and Walker decisions and emphasized that the action was impos-
sible as a matter of proof, citing various medical sources. The majority of
the Appellate Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, citing Justice
Holmes' idea that the unborn child was a part of the mother. This opinion
approved and cited Justice O'Brien's statement from the Walker case that
the legislature should act, not the courts, stating, "In this we fully con-
cur." The judges maintained that it was a legal fiction to say that the child
was in esse, approving Justice Johnson's reasoning in the Walker case.
Thus, it can be seen that the Dietrich and Walker decisions strongly in-
fluenced this court, although all three cases are clearly distinguishable on
their facts. In the Allaire case the child was viable when the alleged in-
jury occurred, and living when the action was commenced; the defendant
was a hospital that not only knew of the infant's presence, but in fact con-
tracted with the mother to assist her maternity. This is a far cry from the
deceased nonviable infant in the Dietrich case, and the carrier who did not
know of the child's presence in the Walker case.
10 Ibid., at 82. 20 Ibid., at 88. 21 1841I1. 359,56 N.E. 638 (1900).
22 Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital, 76 111. App. 441 (1898).
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Justice Windes of the Appellate Court wrote a strong and well
reasoned dissent. He distinguished the Dietrich and Walker cases and
stated that they are not precedent but mere argument. More significantly,
he attacked Holmes' statement, that the child is part of its mother as
illogical when applied to a viable infant that is capable of living inde-
pendently of its mother. He maintained the mother and viable child are
two distinct persons, making an analogy to Chang and Eng, the celebrated
Siamese twins.
Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital was .appealed to the Illinois Supreme
Court, where the Appellate Court decision was affirmed. The majority of
the Supreme Court seemed to think that exactly the same questions were
involved as were decided in the Dietrich and Walker cases.23 The majority
Supreme Court opinion merely quoted, for the most part, portions of the
majority Appellate Court opinion. Justice Boggs dissented in an opinion
that has been widely quoted wherein he makes virtually the same observa-
tions as Justice Windes. Justice Boggs felt a cause of action should lie for
a viable foetus, but seemed to imply that a nonviable foetus could not
recover:
A foetus in the womb of the mother may well be regarded as but a part of the
bowels of the mother during a portion of the period of gestation....24
Justice Boggs advanced no reason why this distinction should exist, or
why a foetus should be regarded as a portion of the bowels of the mother.
He then stated that a foetus is an independent person if it can live inde-
pendently should the mother die. He also felt a lack of precedent was no
reason for the courts to wait for the legislature to grant a cause of action,
and that he believed that mere difficulty of proof should not leave a
wrong to be without a remedy. Like Windes, he also distinguished the
Dietrich and Walker cases.25 Ultimately, and very recently, Justice Boggs'
dissent became the law in Illinois.26
28 "Appellant's counsel has argued the case learnedly and with not a little industry,
but has cited only two cases in which it was attempted to maintain actions involving
the question presented here." Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital, 184 11. 359, 365, 56 N.E.
638, 639 (1900). The cases cited by the appellant-infant were the Dietrich and Walker
cases.
24 Ibid., at 370 and 641.
25 "This case can have little application here, for the reason in the case at bar it
appears from the declaration the child had reached that stage of foetal life when it
was capable of continued existence independent of the mother; that its person was
injured within itself, and it was afterwards born alive and with sufficient strength and
maturity to maintain independent existence, and still lives. It does not follow from the
Dietrich case the plaintiff in this cause should not be recognized as capable of having
a locus standi in court to recover damages for injuries to his person, or that the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts would have so held." Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital,
184111. 359, 372, 56 N.E. 638, 642 (1900).
26Amann v. Faidy, 415 111. 422, 114 N.E. 2d 412 (1953).
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THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
All reasons for allowing or denying recovery to an unborn infant in a
tort action for prenatal injuries, were first presented in the three founda-
tion cases. In summary form, the reasons for denying recovery are as
follows:
1) Lack of precedent.
2) The extreme difficulty or impossibility of proving causal relation
between the trauma to the mother and the prenatal injury or death of the
child.
3) The possibility of fictitious claims should a cause of action be
allowed.
4) That if a cause of action is to be created on behalf of an unborn
infant, it is for the legislature to create it,-not the courts.
5) That the unborn infant is not a person in esse, but rather a part of
its mother, and therefore, having no separate existence, is not a person
within the meaning of the law of torts.
The reasons for allowing a cause of action may be stated:
1) An unborn infant is regarded as a person in existence in the common
law of real and personal property, the criminal law and the civil law.
2) Mere difficulty of proof does not allow a wrong to be without a
remedy. The proof required in these cases is no more difficult than the
proof required in other negligence actions.
3) The possibility of fictitious claims is always present in the law and
does not prevent the granting of remedies.
4) Lack of precedent does not prevent the courts from granting a
cause of action where a wrong has been committed; there is no need to
wait for the legislature to act.
5) A viable unborn infant is a person, and has a separate existence
apart from its mother since it could continue to live independently should
it be separated from her.
The later cases added no new ideas to those already developed in the
foundation cases. Arguments were either accepted or rejected, although
the courts often emphasized one point over another, or else made slight
modifications in language without changing the basic reasons for allowing
or denying recovery. For a long time after the Allaire decision, the cases
consistently denied recovery and this view soon became the weight of
authority.27 Reaction to this position developed, slowly at first, but very
rapidly in recent years. Legal writers criticized the majority view and
advocated recovery for a viable foetus.28 Court decisions soon developed a
27 Authorities cited note 3 supra.
28 Prosser, Torts § 31 (1941); Morris, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere, 58
Cent. L.J. 143 (1904); Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in Law of Torts,
10 Calif. L. Rev. 461 (1922); Frey, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere, 12 St. Louis
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modern trend for allowing recovery. Today, there is almost an even divi-
sion of jurisdictions between the two positions.29
A viable foetus is denied a cause of action for prenatal personal injury,
and his representatives are denied a cause of action under the Wrongful
Death Statutes in the following jurisdictions: Rhode Island, 0 Alabama, 31
Texas,32 Michigan,3 3 Pennsylvania,3 4 New Jersey,35 and Nebraska. 36 The
Dietrich case has been upheld as the law in Massachusetts.3 1
Those jurisdictions allowing a cause of action are: Missouri,38 Louis-
L. Rev. 85 (1927); Gaines, The Infant's Right of Action for Pre-Natal Injuries, [1951]
Wis. L. Rev. 518; James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 N.W. Law Review
778 (1953); 2 De Paul Law Rev. 97 (1952), noting Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349,
102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951).
29 Ten jurisdictions, including Ireland, denied recovery. Eleven jurisdictions, in-
cluding Canada, allow recovery.
30 Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Ati. 704 (1901). Recovery was denied in a
wrongful death action where a viable foetus had been prematurely born alive but
died three days later.
31 Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
Wrongful death recovery denied for death of viable foetus.
32 Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d 944 (1935).
Cause of action denied for wrongful death of viable foetus.
33 Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937). Court cited the
great weight of authority in denying recovery for wrongful death of viable foetus.
34 Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940). Personal injury action
was denied to a viable foetus. This case, in effect, overruled a lower court decision
in Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924), where recovery had been allowed.
35 Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (S. Ct., 1942), dissent at 459 and
685. Denied cause of action for prenatal personal injury to a viable foetus by a vote of
ten to five. The decision upheld an earlier lower court decision in Ryan v. Public
Service Co-ordinated Transport, 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A. 2d 52 (1940).
36 Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (1951). Viable foetus
denied wrongful death recovery.
37Cavanaugh v. First National Stores, 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E. 2d 307 (1952);
Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E. 2d 206 (1950). This court refused to
overrule the Dietrich case, but implied that if the question was before the court for
the first time, it might allow recovery. It must be noted that the foeus involved in
this case was viable, unlike the nonviable foetus of the Dietrich case.
38 Buel v. United Railways Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913). Denied recovery
in a wrongful death action for the death of a viable foetus. The court cited Kirk v.
Middlebrook, 201 Mo. 245, 100 S.W. 450 (1907) where the problem had first come
up but had not been decided because both parties assumed the injuries received by
the child were really injuries to the mother. The Buel case was expressly overruled
and a viable foetus granted a cause of action for wrongful death in Steggall v. Morris,
258 S.W. 2d 577 (Mo., 1953).
COMMENTS
iana,8 9 Canada, 40 District of Columbia,41 California, 42 Ohio, 43 Minnesota, 4 4
Maryland, 45 and Georgia.46 New York formerly denied recovery, 47 but a
recent case reversed that position and allowed the unborn infant a cause of
action.48 The Allaire case was first upheld as the law in Illinois, 49 but, in
1953, it was expressly overruled and wrongful death recovery allowed.50
A few months later, Illinois allowed a cause of action to a viable foetus
for prenatal personal injury.8 '
39 Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App., 1923). This was probably the first
case to allow a viable foetus a cause of action for wrongful death. The decision was
based on the civil law background of Louisiana and interpretation of a statute. Al-
though decided in 1923, the case was not furnished for publication until 1949.
40 Montreal Tramways v. Leveile, [19331 4 D.L.R. 337. The Supreme Court of
Canada granted a cause of action to a child who had been born with club feet through
the alleged negligence of the defendant in causing injury while the child was a viable
foetus in its mother's womb. The court relied on natural justice in granting a cause
of action stating that to do otherwise would compel the child to go through life
"carrying the seal of another's fault, and bearing a very heavy bur en of infirmity
and inconvenience, without any compensation therefor."
41 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. D.C., 1946). Court allowed recovery for
prenatal personal injury to a viable foetus, and strongly implied that a cause of action
to a nonviable foetus would also be allowed.
42 Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939). The court granted
recovery to a viable foetus for prenatal personal injury. The court reached this de-
cision by interpreting the Cal. Civil Code (1949) Div. 1, Pt. 1, S 29, which provided:
"A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far as it
may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth."
43 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 334 (1949).
The court allowed recovery to a viable foetus in a personal injury action. Jasinsky v.
Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E. 2d 809 (1950) extended recovery to wrongful death
cases.
44 Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. 2d 839 (1949). Court allowed re-
covery for wrongful death of viable foetus.
45 Damasiewiz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A. 2d 550 (1950). A cause of action was
granted to a viable foetus for prenatal personal injuiries. The opinion contains an ex-
cellent and exhaustive survey of the law on prenatal injuries.
48 Tucker v. Carmichael and Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. 2d 909 (1951). Recovery al-
lowed for prenatal personal injury to a viable foetus.
47 Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y. Supp. 367 (1913).
Recovery denied a viable foetus for prenatal personal injury. The defendant in this
case was a common carrier and the court relied heavily on the Walker case. In Drobner
v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), recovery was denied a viable foetus for
prenatal personal injury by the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Justice Pound.
Justice Cardozo dissented without opinion.
48 Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951), overruled Drobner v.
Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
49 Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E. 2d 446 (1939).
50 Amann v. Faidy, 415 M. 422, 114 N.E. 2d 412 (1953).
51 Rodriquez v. Patti, 415 111. 496, 114 N.E. 2d 721 (1953). This writer has obtained
information from the plaintiff's attorney that the infant in this case was in the
seventh month of gestation when the injury occurred, and was viable.
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An unusual decision was rendered in Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Rail-
way & Light Co. 52 This was a personal injury action for prenatal injuries
to a nonviable foetus. The infant was in the fifth month of gestation
when the injury occurred, and was living at the time the action was com-
menced. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, after citing previous decisions
denying recovery to viable infants, denied recovery and said:
All, however, so far as expression is found therein, agree that no cause of action
accrues to an infant for injuries received before it could be born viable. Such is
the present case. The complaint alleges the child could not have been born viable.
Since a non-viable child cannot exist separate from its mother, it must in the law
of torts be regarded as part of its mother, and hence, being incapable of separate
existence, it is not an independent person or being to whom separate rights
can accrue.
53
The court implied it would grant recovery to a viable foetus,54 and then
continued:
Neither does the medical or scientific recognitions of the separate entity of an
unborn child aid in determining its legal rights. The law cannot always be
scientific or technically correct. It must often content itself with being merely
practical.55
Thus, the Lipps case denied recovery to the nonviable foetus on two
grounds: 1) the foetus was not a separate person because it could not
live independently of its mother, 2) practical difficulty of proof. The
Lipps case and the Dietrich case are the only two cases expressly denying
recovery to a nonviable foetus. Virtually every other prenatal injury case
has implied that the nonviable foetus could not recover. This is an implica-
tion to be expected from the cases denying recovery to the viable foetus,
but even those cases that allow recovery for the viable foetus imply that
they will not extend a cause of action to the nonviable foetus.
CONCLUSIONS
The early dissents to the decisions denying recovery for prenatal
injuries undoubtedly encouraged the bringing of actions on behalf of
viable infant-plaintiffs. These actions continued even after a great number
of cases had denied recovery, until reaction set in and the courts began to
allow a cause of action. It appears that this modem trend will eventually
become the weight of authority. But this will not aid the nonviable infant.
52 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
53 Ibid., at 275 and 917.
54"Very cogent reasons may be urged for a contrary rule where the infant is viable.
... As to such cases we express no opinion." Ibid., at 276 and 917.
55 Ibid.
COMMENTS
Consequently, actions can be expected to be instituted on behalf of non-
viable infants in an effort to obtain a cause of action in the same manner
as was done for the viable infant. In order to obtain this recovery, two
big hurdles will have to be cleared. These are the arguments that the non-
viable foetus is not a person because incapable of independent existence,
and practical difficulty of proof of causal relation. The first argument is
the most important, and is really a ramification of a far greater problem-
When does life begin? Those courts denying recovery to all unborn in-
fants hold, in effect, that life begins at the moment of birth. Those courts
allowing recovery for the viable foetus hold, in effect, that life begins at
the moment of viability which is about the sixth month of gestation. In
the civil law and the property and criminal fields of the common law, it
is held that life begins at the moment of conception. These contradictions
lead one to inquire: Why is there so little uniformity on this point, and
which view is the correct one? It is submitted that the view that life
begins at the moment of conception is the more logical position. It is
based on reality, and should be adopted in the field of torts. On the purely
physical level, in accord with the law of nature and as demonstrated by
science, human life commences from the moment of conception. 56 Cer-
tainly, it would be absurd to deny the physical reality of the presence of
the nonviable foetus until the sixth month of gestation. The viable foetus
does not materialize out of inanimate matter at the moment of viability
any more than the living infant materialized out of cosmic dust at the
moment of birth. To say that the nonviable foetus is a part of its mother
or that it could not live independently of its mother in support of the
idea that the nonviable foetus is not a person, as was done in the Dietrich
and Lipps cases, is to take an untenable position; for in so saying, these
courts, in effect, recognize the physical existence of the foetus in the
world, but relegate that existence to a lower order of life-perhaps animal
or vegetable, but certainly not human. To recognize the physical existence
of the nonviable foetus means one must recognize it as a human being: its
essence is human, its species is human, and it has an immutable potential
to be born if left undisturbed in the inexorable process of maturation.
Caution is indicated at this point, for even if it be conceded that the
nonviable foetus is a person in esse-a human being-then the second
ground for denying recovery must still be answered. This is the practical
difficulty of proof of causal relation as indicated by the Lipps decision.
56" 'The foetus is certainly, if we speak physiologically, as much a living being
immediately after conception as at any other time before delivery; and its future
progress is but the development and increase of those constituent principles which it
then received.' Beck's Elements of Medical Jurisprudence (10th Ed.) vol. 1, p. 227."
Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 358, 78 S.W. 2d 944, 949
(1935).
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Proof certainly would seem impossible in cases involving a foetus in the
very early stages of gestation, but there seems to be no greater medical
difficulty of proof in cases concerning a five month old foetus than in
cases concerning a six month viable foetus. As to those cases involving
the infant in the very early stages of gestation, reality must be faced, and
if proof be impossible, then the courts must deny a cause of action. But if
a five month nonviable foetus be born deformed, or should die through
the wrongful actions of another in inflicting trauma to its mother, and if
such deformity or death could be proved (as it can) by medical science
to have been caused by these wrongful acts, and the courts forbid a cause
of action and recovery, then surely here is a flagrant wrong without a
remedy. One court has recognized this concept and allowed a cause of
action for personal injury inflicted when the infant was in the third month
of gestation. This case is Kelly v. Gregory, 7 where the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, stated that the problem in prenatal
injury cases is determining the point of legal separability from the mother.
The court expressly held that separability begins at conception because
the mother's biological contribution is merely one of nourishment and
protection. After concluding that the foetus is a separate organism and
remains so throughout its life, the court stated that the fact that the infant
may not live if its protection and nourishment are cut off earlier than the
viable stage of its development does not destroy its separability, but rather
describes conditions under which life will not continue. The court then
pointed out that succeeding conditions exist that have that result at every
stage of life, postnatal as well as prenatal. The court was not troubled
about difficulty of proof, and held:
If the child born after an injury sustained at any period of his pre-natal life can
prove the effect on him of the tort, as for the purpose of this appeal and on the
face of the complaint before us we must assume plaintiff will be able to do, we
hold he makes out a right to recover.58
In holding that life begins at the moment of conception, the court relied
on biological principles. The concepts of natural law, morality and philos-
ophy were not discussed by this court, nor have they been mentioned in
preceding cases, but this is basically a moral problem and these funda-
mental notions have undoubtedly been the ultimate determinants of the
issue. It is well to note that the changing positive law on this subject
marks a return to those immutable natural and moral law principles from
which the earlier cases departed.
57282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 696 (1953).
58 Ibid., at 543 and 698.
